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ABSTRACT
This article proposes an elective tax benefit transfer system to be
available to lessors of property who use that property in their trade or
business. It describes why the current linkage of tax benefits to property
ownership is economically inefficient, causing it to have several significant
disadvantages to the parties and to the economy, as a whole. The article
discusses how the current system reduces a firm's cash flow and reported
earnings, diminishes the intended effect of tax incentive legislation, distorts
competition and decision making, and inhibits investment in efficient
business assets. It is submitted that the proposed system corrects all of the
shortcomings, while not violating any tenet of taxation and being consistent
with Congressional attempts to limit tax avoidance.
I. THE PROPOSAL
Federal income tax law has evolved to a point where it is time to
abandon the linkage between property ownership and entitlement to cost
recovery deductions and property related credits for leases of new equipment
and software.' This paper proposes that lessors be granted an election to
transfer to lessees cost recovery deductions (hereinafter, "CRD") 2 and tax
credits associated with property that is leased under an arrangement that
* Professor Blasi is the Mark and Evelyn Trammell Professor of Tax Law at
Georgia State University College of Law. He was the former chair of the ABA Tax
Section's Committee on Banking and Savings Institutions. He expresses his
gratitude for the extraordinarily helpful research assistance provided by Ms. Laura
Reinhold, a third-year law student, and Mr. Michael Tillman-Davis, the Reference
and Faculty Services Librarian, at Georgia State University College of Law. He also
thanks Professor Mary Radford and Mr. Willard Timm, his colleagues at the College
of Law, Mr. Stanley Hackett of Troutman and Sanders, and Mr. Rob Holzman,
Managing Director, Crestview Capital Advisors, for their very helpful comments on
various drafts of this article.
1. Investment during 2008 in equipment and software exceeded $1.1
trillion. Bureau of Economics Analysis, National Income and Products Accounts,
Fixed Asset Accounts, available at http://www.bea.gov/National/FA2004/E&S.pdf.
See also, Equipment Leasing & Finance Foundation, U.S. Equipment Finance
Market Study, 2007-2008.
2. The term "cost recovery deductions" or "CRD" will be used in this paper
to describe both depreciation and amortizations deductions. It is common for
depreciation to describe cost allocation of tangible property and for amortization to
describe that allocation for intangible property. Investing in new equipment or other
business property may also generate tax credits that reduce tax liability on a dollar-
for-dollar basis. Discussed at Section V of this paper are two property related credits:




qualifies, for federal income tax purposes, as a true lease, i.e. a lease in
which the lessor is treated as the true owner of the property.
This proposal is timely because of the proliferation of property
related tax incentives. Congress has been producing an expanding inventory
of accelerated cost recovery provisions and property related credits in an
effort to achieve a variety of non revenue raising policy objectives. Unless
tax benefits are able to be transferred, the intended impact of tax incentive
legislation, including economic stimulus legislation, will likely not be
achieved, and the nation's economy will not expand as expected. The
proliferation of tax benefits also has exacerbated distortions in the relative
competitiveness of lessors as well as in the decision making of lessees.
Finally, both cash flow and reported earnings of the parties is negatively
affected by current law constraints on tax benefit transferability.
As the discussion of microeconomic principles set forth below will
demonstrate, permitting tax benefits to be sold will increase their efficiency.
For example, a lessor of equipment may elect to sell some or all of the
equipment's CRD to the lessee. The taxpayer may prefer to convert these tax
benefits into cash because it may not be in a position to realize part or all of
the tax savings that the deductions could generate. The tax benefits,
themselves, may not be worth to the property owner what they may be worth
to the transferee. If the lessor were permitted to liquidate the tax benefits, the
lessor would be able to reduce rent, yet derive the same after-tax return from
its investment. The government should be indifferent as to which party to the
transaction utilizes the tax benefit so long as they are used for the intended
purpose.
Nearly 30 years ago, in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
("ERTA"), Congress enacted, then almost immediately repealed, legislation
referred to as "sale harbor leasing.'A It was radical tax legislation that was
3. A true lease for tax purposes is defined in Rev. Proc. 2001-28, 2001-1
C.B. 1156. The factors set forth in the guidelines include representations relating to:
the minimum unconditional at risk investment of the lessor, renewal or extension
options, purchase or sale rights, the lessee's investment in the property. These
guidelines superseded earlier guidelines. Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715; Rev.
Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39. For a comprehensive and critical analysis of the
linkage between property ownership and taxation, in general, see, Noel B.
Cunningham and Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A
"Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 Tax L. Rev. 725 (1991-1992).
4. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981). This provision was intended to
increase the likelihood that the cash flow benefit would be realized from the ERTA's
liberalized cost recovery and investment credit provisions. In the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, Congress
repealed the safe-harbor leasing rules.
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significantly different from this proposal.' Although it also permitted tax
benefits to be transferred, they were transferrable to the lessor, not to the
actual user of the property, as this called for in this proposal. By virtue of a
fictitious sale/leaseback transaction, the nominal lessor became the deemed
owner of the property to whom tax benefits were thereby transferred.
Fundamental tenets of taxation were violated in the process, as was noted in
the Conference Committee Report that accompanied the legislation:
"The new provision is a significant change overriding
several fundamental principles of tax law. Traditionally, the
substance of a transaction rather than its form controls the
tax consequences of a transaction. In addition, a transaction
generally will not be given effect for tax purposes unless it
serves some business purpose aside from reducing taxes.
Because the leasing provision was intended to be only a
transferability provision, many of the transactions that will
be characterized as a lease under the safe harbor will have no
business purpose (other than to transfer tax benefits). When
the substance of the transaction is examined, the transaction
may not bear any resemblance to a lease."'
This proposal does not contravene any anti-tax avoidance statutory
provision or judicial doctrines. To respect current law limits on trafficking in
tax benefits, the proposed system restricts tax benefit transfers to the lessee.
The proposal is limited to tax benefit transfers by the true owner of property
(the lessor) to the party possessing the right to use the property (the lessee). It
is consistent with the business purpose doctrine by permitting tax benefit
transfers only as an adjunct to a bona fide lease of property and not when tax
avoidance is the primary intent behind the transaction. The proposal also
calls for adherence to the substance over form doctrine. No fiction is created
to establish the owner's entitlement to the tax benefits. The lessor from
5. States have not shied away from similarly radical tax legislation. For e.g.,
see the Georgia Entertainment Industry Investment Act of 2008, O.C.G.A § 48-7-
40.26 (2009), which permits production companies to sell tax credits earned for film,
video, or digital production in the state.
6. For a critical discussion of the fictional leasing transactions constructed
by the safe-harbor leasing legislation see, Alvin C. Warren, Jr. and Alan J. Auerbach,
Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing, 95 Harv.
L. Rev. 1752 (1982).
7. General Explanation of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, JCS
71-81, Title II Business Incentive Provisions, No. 7, Sec. 0 (1981) (Joint Comm. on
Taxation).
8. Tomasulo, "Net Operating Losses and Credit Carryovers: The Search for
Corporate Identity," 20 Tax Notes 835, Sep. 12, 1983.
2712010]
Florida Tax Review
whom the tax benefits will be transferred will be the actual owner of the
property, and the lessee or purchaser, the actual user.9
H. ORGANIZATION OF PAPER
This paper has five sections. It begins by establishing that improving
the economic efficiency of property related tax benefits is needed and
justified for several reasons: (a) consistent with the income tax being
imposed on income net of reasonable business expenses, cost recovery
deductions represent a business expense that should be fully deductable from
gross income, (b) the reported earnings of firms should properly reflect tax
expense, (c) tax deductions and credits that are designed to incentivize
behavior are more likely to achieve their economic or social objectives if
they are allowed to be transferred, (d) the current system distorts the
competitive status of lessors, and (e) the current system distorts decision
making of lessees.
In the second section, there is a discussion, with illustrations, of how
laws of microeconomics support the proposal. It is demonstrated that the
volume of property transfers eligible for tax depreciation or credit and the
demand therefore can be predicted to increase if the parties to these
transactions are free to allocate tax benefits between themselves. The effect
of government tax policy on property transfers will be illustrated, and it will
be show that full utilization of intended tax benefits will avoid the
inefficiency caused by underutilized tax benefits.
The third section of the paper will establish that the proposal is
supported by current Internal Revenue Code provisions.10 It will be
explained that even though tax avoidance may be a significant factor
considered by the parties before entering into a transaction underlying the
proposed tax benefit shift, there is no proscription in current law that would
prevent tax benefit transfers intended as an adjunct of a bona fide business
transaction. Provisions will be identified that currently allow tax benefits to
be transferred among taxpayers, even taxpayers that are not owners of the
property giving rise to the tax benefit and even when a tax avoidance intent
influences the transaction.
In the fourth section of the paper, the judicial constraints on tax
avoidance will be discussed. Judicial doctrines dealing with business purpose
9. One of the reasons for the repeal of the ERTA safe-harbor leasing rules
was concern that its revenue cost was large. General Explanation of the Revenue
Provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, H.R. 4961, 97th
Cong, Pub. L. No 97-248, p. 53. This proposal is considerably more modest in terms
of its potential revenue impact.
10. All references to the "Internal Revenue Code," "Code," "section," or
"IRC" are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
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and substance over form will be analyzed and applied to the proposal. It will
be established that the proposal is consistent with these rules
The final section of the paper contains a recommendation for how
the transfer of tax benefits should be taxed. The intended tax-free transfer of
tax benefits will be shown to be consistent with the current treatment of
realized of tax benefits, and it can be reconciled with tax benefits transferred
as an adjunct of tax-free property exchanges under current law.
III. THE IMPACT OF TAx BENEFITS ON LESSORS AND LESSEES
The Constitution authorizes a tax to be imposed "...on incomes,
from whatever source derived... ."1 Congress first exercised the "full
measure of its taxing power [footnotes omitted]"' 2 in The Revenue Act of
1913, a statute designed merely to raise revenue to supplement federal excise
taxes, tariffs, and custom duties, the primary sources of federal government
revenue at the time.'3 As the income tax assumed the dominant revenue
raising role, its ability to serve as a tool of social and economic policy was
recognized. With increasing frequency, federal income tax provisions have
been designed to encourage investment in targeted property and activities,
promote savings, redistribute wealth, stimulate the economy, while, of
course, raising most of the federal government's revenue. The ancillary
objectives are accomplished largely through the use of tax incentives
designed to allow taxpayers to avoid the income tax's revenue raising
objective.
Tax benefits take a variety of forms. They are offered as provisions
that defer or exclude income, accelerate or enlarge deductions, or permit
credits against tax liability. For many commercial enterprises, one of the
most significant incentives that Congress provides is the allowance for
accelerated CRD. However, unless CRD are permitted to be transferred,
accelerated cost recovery may fail as an incentive that influences investment
behavior and the policy objective of accelerating these deductions may not
be achieved.
The benefits flowing from tax incentives that are utilized are
numerous. As will be discussed below, in the short-term a firm's cash flow
and reported earnings will increase. Several long-term and indirect benefits
also result. For example, the acquisition of new equipment made feasible by
11. U.S. Const. Amend. XVI.
12. Comm'r. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955), rehearing
denied, 349 U.S. 925 (1955).
13. The Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16, 38 Stat. 114, ch. 16,
contained the statutory imposition of the income tax at § II(A)(1) where it provided,
in part, "[t]hat there shall be levied ... upon the entire net income arising or accruing
from all sources ... a tax of I per centum per annum upon such income..."
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the tax benefits also result. New equipment likely will operate more
efficiently than the equipment it replaces, thereby further increasing reported
earnings and cash flow. The firm's domestic and international
competitiveness may be enhanced, especially if the depreciable property is a
material factor in the firm's income generation. On a larger scale, the
collective cost savings realized by improved profitability will enhance the
size and strength of the nation's economy.
A. Current System Distorts Lessors' Tax Liability and Cash Flow
For tax liability and cash flow to be properly calculated, all
allowable tax benefits should be taken into account. This fundamental
principal of tax law was recognized in the first income tax statute, which
permitted businesses to deduct most costs associated with earning the income
that comprised taxable income, the income tax base.14 Principal among these
deductions was the property related deduction for cost recovery. Unless tax
liability takes into account allowed deductions and credits, the firm's tax
liability is overstated and its cash flow is understated.
The Revenue Act of 1913 provided "[t]hat is computing net income
for the purpose of the normal tax there shall be allowed as deductions: ...
sixth, a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property
arising out of its use or employment in the business, ..."1s CRD continues to
be the most significant property related deduction. Currently, it is allowed
under section 167, a section that contains language nearly identical to the
1913, provision. The section provides in pertinent part that "[t]here shall be
allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the
,016
exhaustion, wear and tear ... of property used in the trade or business ... .
The allowance for depreciation has long been justified as a
reasonable business expense on the theory that the amount of the annual
deduction represents that portion of the property's initial value that is
estimated to be consumed during the accounting period in generating income
of that period. In 1927, Justice Brandeis wrote in U.S. v. Ludey:
"The depreciation charge permitted as a deduction from the
gross income in determining the taxable income of a
business for any year represents the reduction, during the
year, of the capital assets through wear and tear of the plant
used. The amount of the allowance for depreciation is the
sum which should be set aside for the taxable year, in order
14. IRC § 63.
15. The Revenue Act of 1913, § II G(b), 38 Stat. 172234(a)(7). The Excise
Tax Act of 1909, § 38(2d), 36 Stat. 112, 113, permitted a similar deduction.
16. IRC §§ 167 and 168.
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that, at the end of the useful life of the plant in the business,
the aggregate of the sums set aside will (with the salvage
value) suffice to provide an amount equal to the original
cost. The theory underlying this allowance for depreciation
is that by using up the plant a grandual [sic] sale is made of
it. The depreciation charged is the measure of the cost of the
part which has been sold. When the plant is disposed of after
years of use, the thing then sold is not the whole thing
,,l7originally acquired.
Conversely, a distortion of tax liability occurs when a firm is unable
to benefit from allowable deductions. The cost of the item to which the
deduction relates becomes significantly greater whenever it does not yield a
tax savings. By permitting CRD to be transferred for consideration, a firm is
able to reduce asset cost, albeit indirectly, by the amount of the cash
consideration received for the tax benefit, as the incentivized depreciation
rules intend.
Ability to use tax benefits depends upon there being tax liability,
before taking into account any tax benefits. A firm without adequate federal
tax liability will be unresponsive to tax incentive legislation.' 8 Insufficient
tax liability may be attributable to several factors, including market
conditions peculiar to the taxpayer or general economic conditions.
Moreover, it may occur during either strong or weak economic times. For
instance, if the taxpayer were a tax sensitive business, in a strong business
environment taxable income may be eliminated by tax deductions.
Equipment leasing firms are especially vulnerable to deficiencies in taxable
income. By the nature of their business they generate significant CRD from
the property they purchase to lease. If the lessor is unable to deduct CRD, the
cost of the property is not partially offset by tax savings, causing a rational
equipment lessor to refrain from entering into new leases, unless rent can be
increased. It the taxpayer were in this position, to benefit from the deductions
17. U.S. v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 300-301 (1927).
18. Deductions in excess of current taxable income will result in a "net
operating loss," which is usually allowed to be carried over to subsequent periods.
IRC §§ 172, 465, 469 are examples of sections that permit a deferral of deductions
that cannot be currently used by the taxpayer. An excess of credits over tax liability
before credits will result in a credit carryover. The deferral of the deduction's benefit
will reduce its present value. For example, the present value of a tax savings of $350
that is deferred for three years, assuming a discount rate of 4.5% compounded
annually, would be $294, a 16% reduction in cost savings. A firm that is a member
of a consolidated group is permitted to offset its tax losses against the taxable




and credits, the tax benefits would have to be transferred for valuable
consideration.
The proposal addresses the deficiency in current law by providing
for the tax-free receipt of compensation for transferred tax benefits.19 The
compensation received should equal the value of the benefits transferred, an
amount equal to the benefit if it were retained and fully utilized by the
transferor.
Realized tax benefits have a positive effect on cash flow, not only in
the year of deduction, but over time. Funds not used to pay tax are available
to generate additional cash flow. This cycle - generation of cash flow,
reinvestment of cash flow, generation of cash flow - continues, in theory,
indefinitely. For example, if $100 of tax is saved each year for 5 years and if
the after-tax rate of 4% is earned on the cash not used to pay tax, the
compounded amount of additional cash at the end of the fifth year from the
$100 annual tax savings would be approximately $563.00.20 As the
additional $63 of cash flow is generated over the 5 year period, it is
reinvested and it generates even more additional cash flow. This cash flow
benefit is not achieved if the deductions do not result in a tax savings.
B. Current System Distorts Lessors' Reported Earnings
For financial reporting purposes, leasing transactions could be placed
into one of two categories: capital leases or operating leases.2 ' In the former
the incidents of ownership are transferred to the lessee. In tax parlance, this
is sometimes referred to as a "conditional sales contract." An operating lease
is one in which the lessor retains ownership of the leased property.22
Generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), pursuant to
which firms determine their net income for financial reporting purposes,
similarly require earnings to be charged for depreciation expense in order to
be property reflected. However, reported earnings can be distorted by current
19. The tax treatment of the payment and receipt of compensation for tax
benefits is discussed in § VII of this paper.
20. The compounded amount of an annuity of $100 at a 4% discount rate is
the sum of the value at the end of each of the 5 periods multiplied by the tax savings.
Thus, S = $100 (1 + .04)5.
21. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 13 prescribes the factors
that are to be used to classify a lease as a capital lease or an operating lease for
financial reporting purposes.
22. For a discussion of the implications of off-balance sheet lease financing
arrangements, see report prepared by the Office of the Chief Accountant, Office of
Economic Analysis, Division of Corporate Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Report and Recommendations Pursuant to § 401(c) of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 On Arrangements with Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special
Purpose Entities, and Transparency of Filings by Issuers, beginning at p. 60.
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tax law whenever a firm is unable to utilize all tax benefits. The proposal
eliminates potential distortion whenever potentially unused tax benefits are
transferred to a party who uses them in exchange for valuable consideration.
Financial literature describes CRD as "the process of allocating the
cost of assets such as plant and equipment to the period in which the
company receives the benefits from these assets." 23 A firm's earnings for
financial reporting purposes and for income tax purposes are both negatively
affected when tax benefits do not reduce tax liability; however, the effect of
tax benefits on reported earnings is quite different from the effect on tax
liability.
Reported earnings are reduced by tax expense, just are they are by
other business expenses; however, the reduction is less (a favorable result) if
the tax benefit actually reduces the firm's federal income tax liability. This
positive effect on reported earnings is equal to the firm's marginal tax rate
multiplied by the deduction or by the face amount of a tax credit. For
example, a firm in the 35% marginal income tax bracket will have a net
reduction in reported earnings of only 65% of the cost of depreciable
property if the deduction reduces federal income tax liability. In the parlance
of tax planners, the deduction is "tax effected" for financial reporting
purposes when it is deductible for federal income tax purposes. If, or to the
extent that, the tax deduction does not result in an actual reduction in federal
income tax liability, the deduction may not be tax effected. This will create a
distortion in reported earnings because a portion or all of the cost of the
business asset will not reduce GAAP tax expense. Financial Accounting
Standards Statement No. 109 provides that if there is only a 50% or less
likelihood that the item will be taken into account in the future, the item is
not permitted to be tax effected for reported earnings purposes. 24
GAAP does not require conformity between the method used to
depreciate property for tax purposes and the method used for financial
reporting purposes. In fact, it is customary to employ a straight line method
for financial accounting, even though accelerated depreciation is customarily
used for tax purpose. This creates what is referred to as a timing difference;
that is, a difference between when tax expense is charged to financial
accounting income and when it is paid to the U.S. Treasury. Any excess of
the financial accounting provision for income taxes over the amount reported
on the firm's tax return creates a deferred tax asset.2 5 Timing differences of
this nature do not distort reported earnings.
23. Diamond, Stire and Stire. Financial Accounting Reporting and Analysis
481 (South-Western College Publishing, 2000).
24. Accounting for Income Taxes. Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards
No. 109, §§ 17e, 97 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1992).
25. Whenever an item of income or expense is taken into account in
different years in determining net income for financial reporting purposes or taxable
2010] 277
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The amount of compensation received for the tax benefits should be
includible in book income as other receipts from property sales, but on a tax-
free basis. By treating the amount received for tax benefits this way, the firm
is placed in the same after-tax position it would be in if it realized the tax
benefits directly.26
C. Current System Impedes Effectiveness of Tax Incentive Legislation
Congress enacts special CRD rules to incentivize investment in a
wide variety of business assets. Illustrations of some of these rules include
IRC section 167(f) for computer software, IRC section 168(1) for biomass
ethanol plant property, IRC section 168(e)(4) for railroad grading or tunnel
bore, etc... . These provisions accelerate cost recovery by both shortening
the assets depreciable life and accelerating the rate at which business assets'
cost is recoverable.27 Tax incentives consciously elevate macroeconomic and
social objectives above the tax accounting matching concept and the tax
law's revenue raising objective.
Legislation that accelerates CRD assumes that the investment
behavior of a firm's manager can be significantly influenced by the allure of
reduced current tax liability.29 This was the rational for 1954 Internal
Revenue Code's significant liberalization of depreciation rules that allowed
for the 200% declining balance method and shortened recovery periods.30
income for income tax purposes the book expense for income taxes will not equal
the amount of tax reported on the tax return. Financial Accounting Standards
Statement No. 109 prescribes rules for determining deferred income taxes and
intraperiod tax allocation.
26. The tax treatment of the payment and receipt of compensation for tax
benefits is discussed in § VII of this paper.
27. It also is recognized that many types of equipment contribute more to a
firms earnings in the early years than in later years of the equipment's life.
28. A fundamental concept of tax law that appears to be violated by
accelerated depreciation is the longstanding principle that income must be "clearly
reflected;" that is, the expense for the period are matched with the income from the
period. IRC § 446.
29. A critical analysis of accelerated depreciation is found in Yoram
Margalioth, Not A Panacea for Economic Growth: The Case of Accelerated
Depreciation, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 493 (2006-2007).
30. The amended legislation barred the IRS from challenging a taxpayer's
depreciation if the useful life that the IRS determined to be accurate differed from
the taxpayer's useful life of the property by 10% or less. The statutory amendments
prompted the IRS to alter its pronouncement containing the period over which cost is
recovered. Prior to 1962, depreciation lives were set forth in Bulletin F. In that year,
Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 C.B. 418 was promulgated. It set forth useful lives for four
broad groups and 56 classes of assets within those groups.
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The Senate Finance Committee justified those depreciation liberalization
rules saying:
"More liberal depreciation allowances are anticipated to
have far-reaching economic effects. The incentives resulting
from the changes are well timed to help maintain the present
high level of investment in plant and equipment. The
acceleration in the speed of the tax-free recovery of costs is
of critical importance in the decision of management to incur
risk. The faster tax write-off would increase available
working capital and materially aid growing businesses in the
financing of their expansion. For all segments of the
American economy, liberalized depreciation policies should
assist modernization and expansion of industrial capacity,
with resulting economic growth, increased production, and a
higher standard of living."3
Years later, in response to the weakness in the economy in 1981,
ERTA was enacted. The Preamble to the act stated that it is designed "to
encourage economic growth through ... acceleration of capital cost recovery
of investment in plant, equipment, and real property ... One of the
centerpieces of the ERTA was the section 168 Accelerated Cost Recovery
System. The ACRS system replaced the prior depreciation rules with an
administratively simpler and accelerated system.
In connection with the most recent recession, Congress again turned
to cost recovery rules to stimulate a flagging economy. Among the
provisions contained in The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 (hereinafter, "The 2009 Act") was one that liberalized the "bonus
depreciation" rules that allow for immediate expensing of the cost of many
business assets.
As will be demonstrate below, there is a paradox caused by this
linkage when the tax law is used to stimulate the economy: in weak
economic times when incentives are most needed the incentive provided in
tax benefits tends to have less of an impact, or none at all, than they do
during periods when the economy is strong. By linking tax incentives to
property ownership, the size and vitality of the economy as a whole is
artificially retarded. Fewer transactions will take place because tax benefits
may not be able to reduce cost. The "economic growth, increased production,
and ...higher standard of living" expected to occur from CRD are unlikely to
be realized unless stimulus legislation operates in a tax law environment in
31. S. Rep. No. 83-1622, p. 26 (1954).
32. Preamble to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
34, H.R. Rep. No. 4242 (1981).
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which transferability of CRD is permitted." Inefficient use of tax deduction
and credit legislation also created and exaggerated disparities between
businesses. Those firms that are able to use the incentive are placed at a
competitive advantage over those firms unable to realize the tax benefits.
D. Current System Distorts Lessors' Competitive Status
Competitive neutrality is a fundamental economic principal. It calls
for all parties who operate in a market to be treated in a similar fashion. Tax
policy and other governmental imposed restrictions should not distort the
market equilibrium.3 4 Under the current tax system, lessors operating in the
same market can easily be in financially dissimilar positions, merely because
of tax rules. One lessor may be able to utilize all tax benefits, while another
lessor may not. For example, a lessor that is a member of a consolidated
group of corporations which contains a corporation that generates significant
taxable income is able to derive the full benefit from tax deductions and
credits because the consolidate return rules permit the losses of one
corporation to be offset against the income of another corporation. A leasing
company without the ability to offset its tax losses against the income of
another corporation would have a higher cost of operation.3 s
Thus, those lessors who are able to benefit fully from tax incentives
are in a financial position to charge lower rent than lessor's whose property
cost is not reduced by tax benefits. If tax benefits are permitted to be
decoupled from the lessor's property and allowed to be transferred to the
lessee, the relative competitive status of lessors will become more neutral.
Those lessors who are able to benefit from the tax deductions and credits
associated with the property they lease will no longer be at an advantage over
the lessors unable to absorb those tax benefits.
E. Current System Distorts Lessee Decision Making
The current system significantly distorts the lessee's decision
making because the desire for tax benefits competes with concerns
associated with obsolescence. Many lessees are inclined to lease instead of
purchase property because of they believe that the property is likely to
become obsolete; however, if the property is leased, the taxpayer forgoes the
33. H.R. No. 83-1337 (II), p. 4048 (1954).
34. William D. Eggers, Competitive Neutrality: Ensuring a Level Playing
Field in Managed Competitions. Reason Public Policy Institute, How-to Guide No.
18, p. 6, Mar. 1998.
35. For this reason the current tax rule may also hampers entry of new
leasing firms into the leasing market.
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tax benefits associated with the property. Tax neutrality advocates that
business decisions should not be affected by tax rules. Instead, tax law
should neither encourage nor discourage taxpayers from entering into certain
transactions. 37 Although competitive factors may result in a portion of the
value of the tax benefits restricted to a lessor being reflected in reduced rent,
restrictions on tax benefit transfers and the absence of perfect competition
make distortions likely to occur.
Obsolescence can take many forms. Economic obsolescence occurs
when replacement of equipment offers lower ownership costs. As an
example, an air conditioning unit becomes economically obsolete when it is
less expensive to replace the unit with a more energy-efficient one than it
would be to continue using the existing unit. When innovation makes an
existing product inferior to a new generation of products, the existing
product becomes technologically obsolete. For example, a new operating
system might offer additional functionality, making the old operating system
technologically obsolete but still useful. Functional obsolescence occurs
when a product can no longer be used. This type of obsolescence generally
occurs when a standard changes. For example, printers with parallel ports are
no longer useful when current computers only possess USB ports. In some
industries, obsolescence is frequently planned by manufacturers. This
planned obsolescence is "the production of goods with uneconomically short
useful life so that customers will have to make repeat purchases."39 For
example, automobile manufacturers regularly modify to their models so as to
schedule obsolescence. If tax benefits were available regardless of whether
the property were purchased or leased, as proposed, the lessee's decision will
not be distorted by tax considerations.
36. By leasing property, lessees also avoid incurring indebtedness to
purchase the leased property.
37. The concept of neutrality in taxation is derived from Adam Smith's
canons of taxation. See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, Book V, Ch. 2, Part II, V.2.25-28 (Methuen & Co 1904) (1776).
"Accelerated depreciation is almost certain to give some assets lower effective tax
rates than others and so violate the tax neutrality standard." James Mackie, Capital
Cost Recovery in The Encyclopedia of Taxation and Tax Policy (Joseph J. Cordes,
Robert D. Ebel, and Jane G. Gravelle, eds., Urban Institute Press 2d ed.) (2005).
Additionally, under IRC § 167, only certain types of property may be depreciated,
further frustrating the tax neutrality maxim
38. Attempts to make existing property compatible are usually possible, but
create additional costs to the owner. In such situations, economic obsolescence and
functional obsolescence frequently overlap.
39. Jeremy Bulow, An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence, 101




The following four examples illustrate the effect on a hypothetical
leasing transaction of a lessor's inadequate taxable income and how the
proposal addresses that deficiency.40 The leasing transactions comply with
the definition of true leases for tax purposes and operating leases for
financial reporting purposes.4 '
In the first and second examples, the effect under current law of
CRD on the computation of a lessor's taxable income and the tax treatment
of rental payments to both lessor and lessee is shown. In the first example, it
is assumed that the lessor is able to utilize all CRD, but in the second
example some of the CRD is not utilized.
The third and fourth examples illustrate the proposed system. First, a
shift of all CRD to the lessee is illustrated and then a partial shift. These
examples demonstrate that the proposed system fosters transactions that
otherwise would not be entered into because of the current tax system's
linkage of CRD's with property ownership.
Example 1: Current System with Full CRD Utilization by Lessor
Under the current system, when a property owner utilizes all CRD,
the tax savings is equal to the taxpayer's basis in property multiplied by the
maximum marginal tax rate to which the taxpayer is subject.42 In general, tax
basis is equal to the properties cost, and for most corporate taxpayers the
maximum marginal tax rate is 35%.43
40. The benefit from tax deductions must consider the present value of the
tax savings taking into account any future period in which the benefit is realized. For
a discussion of the value of more or less rapid depreciation allowances see, Douglas
A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation - Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for
Measuring Net Income?, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1979); Walter Blum, Accelerated
Depreciation: A Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income?!!, 78 Mich. L. Rev.
1172 (1980); Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation Revisited - A Reply to
Professor Blum, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1185 (1980).
41. Rev. Proc. 2001-28, 2001-1 C.B. 1156. These guidelines superseded
earlier guidelines. Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715; Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2
C.B. 39.
42. Tax basis of business property is eligible for depreciation. IRC § 167(c);
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(g)-1. The basis of property that may be depreciated is usually its
cost. IRC § 1012. Provisions of limited application prescribe tax basis to be other
than an cost, e.g., § 358 (substituted, IRC § 7701(a)(42)), IRC § 362 (transferred
basis, IRC § 7701(a)(43)) and IRC § 1014 (fair market value).
43. IRC § 11 sets forth the various tax brackets for corporate taxpayers,
with the 35% bracket being reached when taxable income exceeds $10,000,000.
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In this example and in the ones that follow, is it assumed that the
lessor and lessee are both in the 35% federal income tax bracket and that the
lessor purchases property costing $1000 that it intends to lease. If the lessor
uses all CRD associated with the property ($1000), the net cost of the
property to the lessor, excluding any residual value, is $650 because the
CRD reduces tax liability by $350 ($650 = $1000 - (.35 x $1000)). It is also
assumed that at the end of the lease term, the lessor sells the leased property
for $100.00, its residual value. Because the lessor has a zero tax basis in the
property at that time, the proceeds would yield after-tax income of $65.00.
The cost reduction can be passed on to the lessee through reduced
rental payments, shared by the parties, or retained in full by the lessor, all
depending upon competitive and other market factors. Regardless of which
party benefits from the CRD, the leasing transaction would be made more
feasible. The full $350 government cost subsidy would be taken into account.
Assume further that the lessor requires a minimum after-tax return
on its investment ("ROI") of 13%, and the lessee can afford to pay no more
than $715.00 in rent (after tax deduction for rent paid) over the term of the
lease. The lessee is prepared to pay more than the properties net cost
($650.00) if it were to purchase the property outright because of concerns
with obsolescence and the lessor's the inability to obtain suitable financing.
Under these parameters, the parties would both find a lease that calls for
$1100.00 in pre-tax rental payments to be acceptable, as set forth below:"
Income to Lessor Cost to Lessee
1100.00 +-Rent <1100.00>
350.00 4- Tax Savings on CRD -0-
65.00 +Residual (after-tax) -0-
<385.00> +- Tax <Liab.> Savings on Rent - 385.00
<1000.00> +- <Cost of Property> -0-
130.00 Net Benefit <Cost>to Parties <715.00>
The lessor's after-tax ROI (13%) is calculated as equal to the lessor's
after-tax income ($130) divided by the lessor cost of the property ($1000)).
The rental income ($1100), the tax savings from the CRD ($350), and the
income from the sale of the property after the expiration of the lease (after-
tax) are cash inflows to the lessor. They are partially offset by the tax
liability that the lessor is required to pay on the rental income ($385.00 = .35
x $1100.00 and the cost of the property ($1000).45 The lessee's rental cost
44. All positive numbers are cash inflows and all negative numbers are cash
outflows.
45. Rental income is includible in a taxable income. IRC §§ 61 and 63.
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net of taxes, $715.00, is equal to the gross rent ($1100.00) less the tax
savings from deducting rental expense ($385.00 = .35 x 1100.00)."
Example 2: Current System: Unused CRD
If the lessor were unable to deduct CRD, the lessor's cost of the
leased equipment increases. For the lessor to realize the same after-tax ROI,
the rent payable by the lessee would have to increase to cover this additional
cost. If the lessee is unwilling to pay increased rent to compensate the lessor
for the lost tax benefit, the transaction will not be entered into. Assuming that
the lessor is able to utilize only $900 of the $1000 cost recovery deduction,
the cost of the property to the lessor, before residual, increases to $685. The
lessor's ROI drops to 9.5%, as follows:
Rental Income $1100.00
Tax Savings from CRD of $900 315.00
Residual (after-tax) 65.00
Tax Liability on Rent <385.00>
Cost of Property <1000.00>
Net Benefit to Lessor $ 95.00
Given the lessor's requirement that the lease generate an after-tax ROI of at
least 13%, the lessor's inability to realize a tax benefit from the CRD and the
lessee's refusal to increase the rent would cause the lessor not to enter into
the lease.
Example 3: Proposed System: Shifted Benefit from CRD
If the proposed system were adopted, and if the parties agree that the
lessee will provide appropriate compensation to the lessor for the transferred
CRD, the parties would be in the identical position they were in when the
lessor was able to fully use CRD's.
Assume that the lessee compensates the lessor for the $350 tax
benefit with a nontaxable cash payment of $350, an amount equivalent to the
tax benefit.47 Under this scenario, the lessor and the lessee are satisfied
entering into the lease.
46. Rent expense is deductible as an ordinary and necessary expense
incurred in carrying on a trade or business under IRC § 162.
47. Any amount of compensation paid for the CRD that is greater or less
than $350 results in a net benefit to the lessor or a net cost to the lessee. Section VII
of this paper discusses the taxation of the payment and the receipt of the
consideration for transferred cost recovery deductions.
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Full Shift of CRD to Lessee
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Example 4: Proposed System: Shared Benefit from CRD
In this example, as in Example 3, it is assumed that the lessor is
unable to use $100 of the CRD. However, the lease would be entered into if
the lessor were permitted to transfer to the lessee the $100 of unused CRD.
For the lessor to realize the same after-tax ROI an additional non-taxable
cash payment of $35, equal to the tax benefit on the $100 of tax benefit that
otherwise would be unused, would have to be made by the lessee. The cash
flows associated with this transaction appear in the following chart:
Partial Shift of CRD to Lessee
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The reported earnings and cash flow of the lessor (and, presumably,
the lessee) would be favorably affected in Examples 1, 3, and 4 because the
benefit of all deductions is realized. As demonstrated in Examples 3 and 4,
under the proposed system, it is irrelevant which party to the transaction
realizes the tax benefit.
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IV. PROPOSAL SUPPORTED BY MICROECONOMIC THEORY
Laws of economics, in particular, microeconomics, prove the
efficiency of the proposed system by predicting increases in the supply of,
and demand for, leasing transactions.4 8 Microeconomics also aids in
understanding the impact of government tax policy the market for leased
properties.49
An important concept in microeconomics is "elasticity." It describes
the effect on supply and demand caused by price changes. Because tax policy
affects price, taxes being a component of the cost of an item, government tax
policy indirectly has a significant influence on the supply and demand of an
item. Examples will show the impact on supply and demand under the
current law and under the proposal.
Supply and demand curves, essential tools of microeconomic
analysis, visually depict the effect of tax policy on supply and demand. As
discussed below, they reveal that (a) unused tax benefits associated with
property will have a depressive effect on leasing transactions, (b) if market
forces are permitted to influence which party to a leasing transaction utilizes
the tax benefits associated with the property, the value of tax benefits will
more likely equal their objectively calculated maximum possible value,o (c)
because the proposed system reduces the likelihood that tax benefits will be
sub-optimized, it should increase the supply and the demand of property
eligible for lease with the attendant positive effects on the parties and the
economy as a whole.
A. "Utility" Maximized/Inefficiency Minimized by Proposed System
A principal goal of market-based economic systems is to allocate
resources in a way that satisfies "people's needs and desires" in as efficient a
manner as possible.5 The efficiency of the economy is optimized when as
48. Microeconomics is a branch of economics that deals with the decision
making tendencies of individuals, firms, and some local governments.
49. Economics, Fifteenth Edition, p. 55 (Paul A. Samelson and William D.
Nordhaus, eds., McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995). Classical economic theory looked to
market forces alone for resource allocation. Adam Smith's belief in the dominance
of self-interest is evident from his statement that "[i]t is not from the benevolence of
the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard
to their own interest." Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, Book I, Ch. 2, Part 1.2.2 (Methuen & Co 1904) (1776). Thus,
classical economic theory looked to market forces alone for resource allocation.
50. For deductions this is the highest marginal tax rate multiplied by the
amount of the deduction and for credits it is the face amount of the credit.
51. Economics, Fifteenth Edition, pp. 12, 73 (Paul A. Samuelson and
William D. Nordhaus, eds., McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995).
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many efficient trades as possible are made.5 2 When this is done, the "utility,"
or satisfaction that market participants derive from their limited resources, is
maximized. The efficient use of limited resources, such as tax benefits, is
essential for an economy to operate at the optimum level. Inefficiencies
typically increase costs and decrease transactions.5
The well established economic principle of utility maximization
finds it origins in the writings of Jeremy Bentham, an Eighteenth Century
philosopher, who defined utility as "that property in any object, whereby it
tends to produce benefit ... or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain ...
to the party whose interest is considered ... . Bentham wrote "[o]f an
action that is conformable to the principle of utility one may always say
either that it is one that ought to be done or at least that it is not one that
ought not to be done."55 Thus, a system that eliminates inefficiencies and
maximizes the utility of the parties to a transaction "ought to be done."
Under the current system, if a lessor fully utilizes its tax benefits, the
rent charged for the item (its price) could be less than if the lessor's cost of
the item were not reduced by tax benefits. If, and to the extent that, the lessor
were unable to optimize tax benefits, rent would have to be increased for the
lessor to cover its increased cost. As rent increases, the demand for the item
can be predicted to decrease. Of course, if a different lessor, such as a
member of a profitable consolidated group, were able to fully utilize tax
benefits, then the transaction would be entered into, but the tax law would
have distorted the competitive status of the lessors.
52. Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy, Second Edition, p.
4 (Worth Publishers, 2007).
53. Ideally, policy makers should attempt to keep the economic pie as large
as possible, while securing funds to promote their social welfare objective. Some
degree of trade-off between the size of the economic pie and the government's
ability to provide for the welfare of society is preferred. Ideally, policy makers
should attempt to keep the economic pie as large as possible, while securing funds to
promote their social welfare objective. These are not necessarily inconsistent goals.
Having a smaller economic pie may not be all bad. Funds acquired by taxing a
transaction can be used to promote what the political leaders believe be the social
welfare of the society. Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy, Second
Edition, p. 50 (Worth Publishers, 2007).
54. John Stewart Mill significantly expanded Bentham's philosophy. While
Mill embraced the philosophical underpinning of the economic objective of
Bentham's utility theory, he argued that happiness or satisfaction varies among
people and an economic system should seek to raise the quality of satisfaction as
determined by a more sophisticated (educated) group.
55. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation, p. 2 (Hafner Publishing Co., 1948).
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B. Supply and Demand Analysis Predicts Effectiveness of Proposal
The following graphs reveal the effect of CRD on the supply and
demand of leased property. They will show that the current system causes a
decrease in the demand for leased property when CRD are underutilized.
Regardless of whether the lessee is willing to pay higher rent or the lessor
absorbs the increased cost, increased cost reduces the combined "utility" to
the parties of the transaction. Conversely, if tax law is amended to permit the
lessor to transfer unused deductions to the lessee, both parties are benefited
and utility enhanced.
The slope of supply and demand curves reveals the elasticity of
supply and demand; that is, the extent to which changes in price affect the
quantity of the property supplied and demanded. Both rent charged for
property and the price of an associated tax benefit are subject to elasticity
theory. The price paid for tax benefits is elastic when the value of tax
benefits to the property owner is less than to the potential transferee." This
occurs, for instance, whenever the nature of the property owner's business
causes it to have less of a need for tax benefits. The price paid for tax
benefits is likely to be less elastic during times of general economic
weakness, when both a lessor and a lessee are likely to place a lower value
on deductions or credits.
The application of microeconomics laws establish that utility
associated with tax benefits varies inversely with price that a transferee is
willing to pay for them. The willingness of a property owner to sell tax
benefits generally moves directly in proportion to their value. The demand
for tax benefits reveals the degree of utility they yield to a prospective
transferee. If utility declines but price is unchanged, the demand for the tax
benefit also declines. The normal relationships between price and the value
56. The extent to which price is elastic is determined by dividing the
percentage change in quantity demanded by the percentage change in price. The
elasticity of demand may vary depending on several factors including (a) whether
the item is a "necessity," (b) whether there are substitutes for the item, and (c)
whether the timing of the acquisition of the item is flexible.
57. One significant variable that could change the impact of a tax on the
consumer and producer is whether the consumer has options to purchase substitute
goods or services and other transactions that could provide the consumer and
producer with a similar level of satisfaction. Conversely, if the transaction is merely
optional or if there are substitute transactions, then demand for the financial
transactions is elastic. A consequence of this elasticity would be for the drop in the
quantity demanded for the financial transactions at given prices to adversely affect
the profits derived by the financial institution from this type of transaction. The
financial institution will have to discontinue production of financial transactions to
avoid a financial loss.
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to the property owner of the deductions are what cause the classic demand
curve to slope downward and the supply curve to slope upward.
C. Charting Supply and Demand of Leased Property
The application of these economic principles to a hypothetical
leasing transaction is depicted on the following demand and supply charts.
In the first two charts, hypothetical levels of demand and supply are graphed.
In the third chart, the number of leases entered into is predicted, assuming
that the lessor currently utilizes all tax benefits. What happens when tax
benefits are not fully utilized is depicted in the fourth chart. The fifth chart
shows the positive effect on the number of transactions when the proposed
system replaces current law.
1. Demand Chart
This chart shows the quantity of leases entered into at rents ranging
from 1.0 to 3.0. The quantity of leases demanded appears on the horizontal
18
axis and the rent appears on the vertical axis.
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Quantity of Leases
Predictably, as rent decreases from 3.0 to 1.0, the quantity of leases
that are likely to be demanded increases from 1 to 5. The downward sloping
58. For illustrative purposes, the slope of this demand curve is linear.
Normally, the slope will change in a nonlinear way causing the line to be curved.
Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that the curved line will be a "smooth" curve.
Variables can often change in a nonlinear and erratic fashion.
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relationship between quantity demanded and rent charged depicts the
economic "law of downward-sloping demand." Economic theory attributes
the slope of a demand curve to the "substitution effect" and the "income
effect." Because of the substitution effect, a lessee would be inclined, as rent
increases to substitute other property for the more expensive leased property.
A party may be more inclined to lease less productive property or property
with a higher likelihood of early obsolescence. The income effect shows that
a lessee's limited financial resources constrain the lessee's demand.
Although this chart reveals the number of leases that the lessee is willing to
enter into, it does not predict the number of leases that would be entered into.
Only after considering the lessor's willingness to lease the property can that
be predicted.
2. Supply Chart
The next chart shows the hypothetical quantity of leases for that
same property that the lessor is willing to enter into at those same rents,
assuming that the lessor is able to utilize all tax benefits associated with the
leased property.
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Quantity of Leases
The upward slope of the supply curve reveals that as rent increases
(the vertical axis) from 1.0 to 3.0 the lessor is willing to enter into an
increasingly larger number, 1 to 5 units, of leases (the horizontal axis). There
are several explanations for the increase in rent as the number of leases
willing to be entered into also increases. Economic theory propounds a law
of diminishing returns, which provides that a higher percentage of cost will
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be incurred to enter into each additional lease. The higher cost could be
associated with the limited supply of property available to the lessor or the
diminishing capacity to utilize tax benefits. In this chart, however, all tax
benefits are used.
3. Equilibrium
In the next chart, the previously constructed demand and supply
curves are overlaid to determine the point at which the demand and supply
are in equilibrium.
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Quantity of Leases
At rent of 2.0, where the supply and the demand curves intersect, the
market for the leased property is in equilibrium. The quantity of leases to the
left of equilibrium, 3.0, are likely to be entered into because, until 2.0 of rent
is reached, the rent expense paid by the lessee and realized by the lessor are
acceptable to both parties. In other words, the quantity of leases demanded
and supplied are equal. Beyond this point (to the right of equilibrium), the
rent sought by the lessor is incompatible with the rent that the lessee is
willing to pay for the additional leases.
4. Supply Equilibrium Shift-Deadweight Loss Created
The next graph reveals what occurs when the lessor is unable to fully
utilize CRD. The increase in the purchase price of the leased property
resulting from the lessor's inability to reduce cost by tax savings creates a
"deadweight loss that causes the acceptable rents to increase, or to shift
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A "deadweight loss" is the amount of lost satisfaction experienced
by purchasers and suppliers when the cost of supply increases. In a situation
involving a lessor and lessee it quantifies the reduced number of leasing
transactions entered into because of the inefficiency caused by unutilized tax
benefits.5 9 The deadweight loss is greater if demand is elastic; that is, it
increases at a greater rate as the tax cost increases. Increased costs that cause
slight changes to equilibrium will have little or no effect on the amount of
deadweight loss.
Because the lessor's cost of the leased property increases, the rent
charged would have to increase for the lessor to realize its acceptable ROI.
When this occurs, the quantity of leases that are entered into, assuming
demand remains static, declines by 10% (.5 fewer leases). Only if the lessor
were able to increase rent to compensate for the increased cost from
unutilized tax benefits, will the quantity of leases remain the same.60 In either
case, in this situation, either the lessor or the lessee would be worse off.
59. John Maynard Keynes explains this with a story in which a failing
business repeatedly raises prices in order to become profitable, all the while the
higher prices have the effect of increasing the business's losses. In theory, if prices
were lowered, sales may increase along with overall profits. Thus, it is often said that
the economic effect of a tax increase may be a decrease tax revenues or the
economic effect of a decrease in taxation may be an increase in tax revenue. John
Maynard Keynes, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (Macmillan,
Cambridge University Press, 1972).
60. The extent to which transactions will decrease is, in part, a function of
the "elasticities." For example, an inelastic demand will result no decrease in
transactions.
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5. Supply and Demand Equilibrium Shft---Deadweight Loss
Eliminated
The next chart demonstrates that if the proposed system were
adopted and the tax benefits were sold to the lessor, the increased cost,
expressed as additional rent, would be acceptable to the lessee because it
would be offset by an equal amount of tax savings. The deadweight loss is
eliminated. The equilibrium point would then shift back to the right because
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Assuming that the full value of the tax benefits are exchanged for a
comparable amount of rent, the quantity of leases entered into would be 3.0,
the same as under the third chart when the lessor was able to deduct all
CRD.61
V. PROPOSAL SUPPORTED BY CURRENT STATUTORY LAW
A. Tax Benefit Transfers
The Conference Committee Report accompanying ERTA indicated
that safe-harbor leasing tax benefit transfers violated the anti-avoidance,
61. These examples do not take into account the income tax that is paid on
the rental income or the deductions that are allowed on the rental expense because




business purpose, and sham transaction tenets of taxation.62 Although current
law would have to be amended to allow the proposed sale of tax benefits, the
following discussion explains why the proposal does not violate any of these
(or other) tax tenets. In fact, the proposal is consistent with modem day tax
provisions that permit, or in some cases require, the mobility of tax benefits
and that encourage transactions by harnessing tax avoidance intent.
The discussion begins with a review of statutory law relating to tax
incentive provisions that provide for the purchase of tax credits and the
transfer of tax basis. Next, statutory provisions aimed at preventing tax
benefit transfers when tax avoidance is evident will be examined. These
discussions will be followed by a brief analysis of judicial tax doctrines
relating to tax avoidance, business purpose, and substance over form.
1. Tax Credit Transfers
Current law permits a tax-free acquisition of tax credits for cash or
other property by a taxpayer who does not hold legal title to the property
generating the credit and who may have no involvement with the activity in
which the credit generating property is employed. The New Markets Tax
Credit and the Low-Income Housing Credit are two of several examples of
incentive provisions that permit tax benefit transfers despite the obvious
presence of a tax avoidance intent.
The New Markets Tax Credit ("NMTC") is designed "to encourage
investors to make investments in low-income communities that traditionally
lack access to capital." The NMTC rules allow any "taxpayer who holds a
qualified equity investment" in a "qualified community development entity"
to take a tax credit, spread over six years, equal to approximately 39% of the
taxpayer's investment.s Congress designed the NMTC to provide an
inducement that a development entity may employ to raise capital for the
development of low-income community projects. Through the end of 2008,
a total of $19.5 billion of NMTC have been awarded to 364 applicants. 6
62. See discussion of ERTA at § I, hereof.
63. Other tax incentives are also available when taxpayers make loans to, or
equity investments in, small businesses owned by socially or economically
disadvantaged persons certain and licensed by the Small Business Administration.
64. IRC § 45D. The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-554, § 121(a), 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). GAO Report, "New Markets Tax
Credit," Apr. 2009, GAO-09-536.
65. IRC § 45D.
66. Community Development Financial Institutions Fund, New Markets
Tax Credit Program, available at www.cdfifund.gov/Whatwe-do/programs-id.asp?
programlD-5, last revised Aug. 17, 2009.
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The Low-Income Housing Credit ("LIHC") has a similar purpose. It
is designed to be an "efficient mechanism for encouraging the production of
low-income rental housing."67 The Report of the Senate Finance Committee
that accompanied the legislation, describe the intended efficiency and
incentive aspects of the legislation:
"The committee is concerned that the existing tax
preferences for low-income rental housing have not been
effective in providing affordable housing for low-income
individuals. The committee believes a more efficient
mechanism for encouraging the production of low-income
rental housing can be designed than the variety of subsidies
existing under present law."68
The LIHC may be claimed with respect to newly constructed or
substantially rehabilitated qualified low-income housing. The credit is
available to any taxpayer having a beneficial interest in a special purpose
trust, which is the customary vehicle for holding title to the property. The
credit is equal to the "applicable percentage" of the "qualified basis of each
qualified low-income building." In general, the applicable percentage for any
month is the percentage which will yield over a 10-year period amounts of
credit which will have a present value equal up to 70% of the qualified basis
of the low-income building. The credit may be transferred by acquiring the
underlying property. A taxpayer who purchases a building is entitled to the
credit to which the prior owner of property was entitled.
The intention of taxpayers who invest in the properties qualifying for
either the NMTC or the LIHC is to reduce their tax liability. The credit
acquisitions, however, are accompanied by bona fide investments that
achieve a Congressional objective. Nonetheless, the investor has a
relationship to the credit generating property not unlike the relationship that a
passive investor has in property held by a publicly traded corporation. The
taxpayer to whom the credit is transferred does not hold title to the property
that generates the credit nor does the taxpayer have to be involved in the
activity in which the property was employed. Both of these provisions, and
the several others that are similar in their scope, do not restrict sale of credits
to a counterparty in a transaction involving the lease of property. Thus, in
this respect, they are considerably more liberal than the proposed system.
What they do have in common with the proposed system is the ability of the
67 IRC § 42. Pub. L. No. 99-514, H.R. Rep. No. 3838, 99th Cong. § X
(1986). The credit was significantly expanded by the Community Renewal Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
68. H.R. Rep. No. 99-3838, p. 758 (1986).
69. IRC § 42(d)(7).
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property owner to sell valuable tax benefits as an adjunct to a transaction that
has a significant non tax purpose.
2. Tax Basis Transfers-to Other Taxpayers
There are several current tax law provisions that permit tax basis to
be transferred in exchange transactions between unrelated taxpayers, even
when the relationship between the transferor and the owner of the property
after the basis transfer is quite remote. A tax basis shift often yields tax
deductions to the transferee with respect to the underlying property because
tax deductions typically inhere in tax basis. Consequently, the ability to shift
basis under current law is usually the equivalent of shifting tax benefits.70 So
long as the transferred basis occurs in conjunction with one of the several
nonrecognition provisions in the Code, a transfer of tax benefits inherent in
the basis of the transferred property will be respected.71 Unrecognized gain
or loss typically is preserved in the transferred basis in nonrecognition
transactions.
The following discussions of sections 351 and 1041 illustrate the
opportunity to transfer tax benefits inherent in tax basis. Both sections allow
for tax nonrecognition because of strong policy reasons. In the case of
section 351, the purpose of the nonrecognition rule is to facilitate the
formation of capital in those situations where only the form of ownership has
changed,72 and in section 1041 Congress eliminated the conflicting treatment
of property transfers between spouses occasioned by different state laws.
Strong policy objectives behind incentive legislation are adequate to justify
the transferred basis rule of the proposed system.
Section 351 prescribes a nonrecognition rule for transfers of property
in exchange for stock in a corporation controlled by the transferor or group
of transferors immediately after the transfer. With its companion transfer
basis rule contained in section 362, it has the effect of permitting tax benefits
to be transferred from the transferee to a corporation and then shared by the
corporation's shareholders.
A simple illustration reveals how significant tax benefits can be
shifted to the corporation and then, albeit indirectly, to the other corporate
shareholders. Assume that there are two transferors, Transferor A and
Transferor B. Transferor A transfers to newly formed Corporation C property
70. Another tax benefit associated with tax basis is the reduction that it has
on the amount of realized gain.
71. IRC § 7701(a)(45). A nonrecognition transaction is an exception to the
general tax rule that requires the recognition of gain or loss whenever property is
disposed of. IRC § 1001(c).
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c); Portland Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 109 F.2d 479,
488 (1st Cir. 1940).
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with a tax basis of 40 and a fair market value of 100, and Transferor B
transfers to Corporation C property with a tax basis of 160 and a fair market
value of 100. Thus, there is 60 built-in gain in A's property and 60 of built-
in loss in B's property. Section 351 in conjunction with section 362 will
cause the tax burden associated with half of Transferor A's built-in gain to be
indirectly shifted to Transferor B in exchange for one-half of the stock of the
corporation and one-half of the tax benefit associated with Transferor B's
built-in loss is shifted to Transferor A for the other one-half of stock.73
Sharing the characteristics of tax basis is a permissible transfer of tax
benefits.74 The notion that nonrecognition is appropriate because a mere
change in the form of ownership has occurred fails to account for the
possible remoteness of the ownership interest after the transfer. It is
irrelevant under the rules of sections 351 and 362 what the percentage of
ownership that the transferor has in the transferee corporation after the
transaction, what the relationship that the transferors has with the other
shareholders, and what the transferors involvement is with the transferred
property after the transaction. More significantly, it appears that there is no
restriction on Transferor A agreeing before the transfers that Transferor B
will receive more than half of the stock of the corporation in consideration of
the tax benefit he is transferring. Any additional consideration received for
tax benefits will not be treated as taxable boot.
Transferring tax deductions themselves is permitted in section 351
transactions by virtue of section 357. It permits deductions with respect to a
liability of a transferor to be transferred to a corporation in exchange for
stock.7 5 To the extent that the payment of the liability generates a corporate
tax deduction or an addition to the corporation's tax basis, the tax savings
flowing therefrom will inure to the benefit of all shareholders.7 6 To illustrate,
assume that Transferor D transferred $30,000 of liabilities for unpaid
utilities, salaries, and other operating expenses to Corporation D in a
transaction that qualified under section 351. Assume also that there were
two other transferors. One-third of Transferor D's deductions would inure to
the benefit of each of the other shareholders. Thus, with respect to both tax
basis and tax deductions current law permits an indirect shift of tax
73. This assumes that Transferor B and the Corporation have made the basis
election provided for in IRC § 362(e)(2)(C). For there to be a valid nonrecognition
transaction under IRC § 351 there must be a valid business purpose for the
transaction. The business purpose doctrine is discussed below.
74. Even before a disposition of property, the transferee corporation will
realize the effect of any built-in gain or loss through greater or lesser CRD.
75. These deductions may be shifted to the corporation in an IRC § 351
transaction under the provisions of IRC § 357(a) and (c)(3) but only when the
transferor transfers other property to the corporation.
76. Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36; Hempt Bros., Inc., v. U.S., 490 F.2d
1172 (3rd Cir. 1974).
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benefits. The applicable section 351 and 357 nonrecognition rules and basis
or deduction transfer provisions are mandatory, not elective.
Tax law provisions also prescribe a mandatory nonrecognition rule
with accompanying tax basis shift in certain property transfers (not
necessarily exchange transactions) between individual taxpayers. For
example, section 1041, which mandates nonrecognition of gain or loss on
transfers of property between spouses or former spouses incident to a
divorce, requires the transferor's tax basis to be shifted to the transferee.7 8 It
is irrelevant whether the property may have been transferred for no
consideration, for its market value, or for any another amount.7 9
3. Tax Basis Transfers-to Other Property Owned by Taxpayer
Current law also prescribes rules for tax benefit transfers between or
among properties owned by a single taxpayer in a way that may accelerate
the tax benefits to the property owner. A few of the numerous nonrecognition
transactions in which basis is shifted from one property owned by a taxpayer
to other (usually acquired) property, include transfers to controlled
corporations,80 transfers to a partnership," receipt of stock or stock rights, 82
like-kind exchanges, including exchanges of insurance contracts, and
involuntary conversions.84
To illustrate, tax benefits can be accelerated by virtue of the like-
kind exchange rules of section 1031. Assume that Transferor A exchanges
vacant farm land with a basis of $60 and a fair market value of $100 for
rental property owned by Transferor B. Tax rules permit the taxpayer to
avoid recognizing the $40 of gain on this transaction, but require the
taxpayer to ascribe the $60 farm land basis to the rental real property, the
77. That the drafters recognized the shifting nature of IRC § 351 rules can
be discerned from the very different approach taken in the rules applicable to
transfers of property to partnerships. IRC § 704(c) expressly prohibits the shifting of
a transferor partner's tax benefits (and burdens) to the other partners. Instead, any
benefits associated with tax basis and deductions are traced back to the particular
transferor and are not shared by the other partners.
78. IRC § 1041(b)(2).
79. A similar rule is contained in IRC § 1015(a) for gifts, generally.
Pursuant to this rule, a tax basis rule applicable when gifts are made requires the
donor's tax basis to be shifted to the donee. An exception is provided when the fair
market value of the property at the time of the gift exceeds the donor's tax basis and
the property is sold by the donee at a loss.
80. IRC § 351 and § 358.
81. IRC § 721 and § 722.
82. IRC § 307.
83. IRC § 1031(d) and § 1035.
84. IRC § 1033(b).
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"exchanged basis property." After the exchange, Transferor A is permitted
to take CRD equal to the portion of the $60 basis that is properly allocable to
the building and other like-kind depreciable property acquired in the
exchange. Before the transaction no CRD were allowed because the entire
basis was attached to land, which is a nondepreciable asset.
B. Tax Avoidance Intent
Under current statutory law, a taxpayer's intention to avoid tax, the
principal or sole purpose for the proposed sale of tax benefits, will not
prevent the proposed tax benefit transfers. As discussed below, statutory law
expressly incentivizes taxpayers with tax avoidance. However, statutory
provisions also exist that deny tax benefit transfers when (a) tax avoidance
intent is not associated with a Code provision designed to further some
Congressional social or economic objective or (b) when the transaction
containing tax avoidance intent is entered into without an overriding business
purpose.
1. Current Statutory Provisions Employing Tax Avoidance
Commenting on the allure of tax avoidance, the renowned British
economist John Maynard Keynes is said to have quipped: "[t]he avoidance of
taxes is the only intellectual pursuit that carries any reward."8 6 Realizing, as
this quote reveals, the antipathy that taxpayers have toward tax liability, he
advocated in favor of tax incentives and other types of governmental
intervention in the economy when stimulus was needed.
The Code is replete with sections that contain implicit Congressional
legitimization of tax avoidance intent. The discussion above of the NMTC
and LIHC and the economic stimulus provisions are illustrations of
Congressional intervention in the economy with legislation that harnesses tax
avoidance tendencies. More targeted concerns associated with energy
independence prompted the enactment of tax incentive provisions contained
in The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. According to the
law's preamble, it purpose was "...to amend the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 to provide incentives for energy production and conservation ...
85. IRC § 7701(a)(44).
86. The Forbes Book of Business Quotations 820 (Ted Goodman ed., Black
Dog & Leventhal Publishers) (1997).
87. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). See also, the preamble to
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that describes the purpose of
the legislation as: "Making supplemental appropriations for job preservation and
creation, infrastructure investment, energy efficiency and science, assistance to the
unemployed, and State and local fiscal stabilization, for the fiscal year ending Sep.
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The incentives enacted include accelerated CRD and tax credits for various
energy related investments. For example, The 2008 Act cut in half the cost
recovery period for any qualified smart electric meter and any qualified
smart electric grid system,88 and qualified all cellulosic biofuels for an
immediate cost recovery deduction equal to 50% of the cost of the biofuel
facilities.89 The 2008 Act also enhanced the provisions of the existing Energy
Credit by allowing the credit to be taken for investments in an expanded
category of property. It increased the credit limit for fuel cell property,
removed prohibition on public utility property qualifying for the credit,
allowed the credit for alternative minimum tax purposes, etc... .90 The Credit
for Electricity Produced from Renewal Resources,9' the Qualifying
Advanced Coal Project Credit,9 2 and the Qualifying Gasification Project
credit, 93 the Biodiesel Fuels and Alternative Fuel Credit 94 were also
expanded.
Numerous other targeted provisions that depend on taxpayers' tax
avoidance tendencies have been enacted over the years to advance more
targeted government objectives. They provide additional evidence of
Congresses approval of tax avoidance intentions. For example, special
accelerated cost recovery rules have been enacted to encourage investment in
pollution control facilities," research and experimentation expenditures, 96
reforestation expenditures, soil and water conservation expenditures,
etc... . These special rules are more favorable than, and, thus, provide an
added incentive to, the accelerated cost recovery rules applicable to other
business property.
All of these provisions evidence Congressional approval of tax
avoidance as an incentive to address a social or economic policy concern.
The transfer of tax benefits is the tool used to achieve the objective. So long
as the underlying transaction required by the tax avoidance legislation is
engaged in, the tax benefit transfer is acceptable.
30, 2009, and for other purposes." Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, H.R. Rep. No. 5
(2009).
88. IRC § 168(e)(3)(D).
89. IRC § 168(l)(1)(B).
90. IRC § 48.
91. IRC § 45.
92. IRC § 48A.
93. IRC § 48B.
94. IRC § 40A.
95. IRC § 169.
96. IRC § 174.
97. IRC § 194.
98. IRC § 175.
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2. Statutory Constraints on Tax Avoidance
Unless appropriate limitations accompany the proposal, tax abuse is
likely to result. As one court observed, "[a] tax system of rather high rates
gives a multitude of clever individuals in the private sector powerful
incentives to game the system."" Current law prescribes limits on tax benefit
transfers in transactions where tax avoidance intent is evident. Although the
proposed system, as discussed below, does not violate any of these limits, it
should constrain its tax avoidance orientation with reasonable limitations on
transferring tax benefits, and these constraints should be consistent with
current statutory tax avoidance limitations. Following is a discussion of
salient provisions of current statutory law that deny tax benefit transfers if
tax avoidance is the intent of the transaction.
There is no absolute or overarching proscription against tax
avoidance contained in the Code. Instead, Congress has designed targeted
sections that deny or limit tax benefits if tax avoidance is found to exist. For
example, section 532 imposes an accumulated earning tax on corporations
"formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect
to its shareholders ... ,"'0o and section 7872 treats as a below-market loan to
which interest is imputed any such loan "the principal purpose of the interest
arrangement of which is the avoidance of any Federal tax."o0 With some of
these provisions, tax avoidance must rise to the level of being the "principal
purpose" for entering into the transaction, but with other provisions a lower
threshold is sufficient to deny expected tax benefits.
The tax anti-avoidance section with the broadest scope, the one that
applies to the widest variety of property transfers, and the one that probably
has the richest judicial history is section 269. It employs the "principal
purpose" standard.10 2 The section 269 "principal purpose" threshold, and not
a lower threshold for denial of tax benefits, should be employed in the
proposed system because tax avoidance is intended under the proposed
system to incentivize the parties to engage in a purchase or leasing
99. ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Earlier, Mr. Justice Cardozo in Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 676 (1933) referred to
the proclivity to craft tax avoidance schemes as stemming from taxpayers' "fertility
of invention."
100. IRC § 532(a). The evidence that established the purpose to avoid
income tax is prescribed in IRC § 533.
101. IRC § 7872(c)(1)(D). In addition to these sections regulations deny tax
benefit transfers. For e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-15, -21, and -22, regarded as quasi-
statutory provisions because of the specific grant of rule making authority in the area
of consolidated returns prescribed in IRC § 1502, deny net operating loss carryovers.
102. IRC § 269 limits the transfer of tax benefits when control of a




transaction. Thus, it is expected be one of the purposes for entering into the
transaction, but as a mere adjunct to a bona fide commercial transaction.
Section 269 is helpful in other ways when designing anti-abuse elements of
the proposed system. The section's legislative history and the regulations
promulgated under the section contain useful guidance on the meaning of the
term "tax avoidance," a term not defined in the Code, and when tax
avoidance becomes the "principal purpose" of an acquisition. A thorough
discussion of section 269 is beyond the scope of this paper, but some of the
highlights of its legislative history are instructive to understand the limits on
its scope imposed by the "principal purpose" standard.
Section 269 disallows "the benefit of a deduction, credit, or other
allowance" in acquisitions of a controlling interest in a corporation or
property of a corporation where basis is shifted, if the "principal purpose for
which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of Federal income
tax ... . A 1943 House Ways and Means Committee report accompanying
the enactment of the predecessor to section 269 states that the section was
"designed to put an end promptly to any market for, or dealings in, interests
in corporations or property which have as their objective the reduction
through artifice of the income or excess profits tax liability."'0According to
the related Senate Report, the section becomes operative whenever "the
evasion or avoidance purpose outranks, or exceeds in importance, any other
one purpose." 05 Current Treasury Regulations under section 269 state that
evidence of the proscribed purpose exists whenever "the transaction was not
undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct of the business of the
taxpayer, by the unreal nature of the transaction such as its sham character,
or by the unreal or unreasonable relation which the deduction, credit, or other
allowance bears to the transaction."10 6
103. IRC § 269.
104. H. R. Rep. No. 78-871, § 49 (1943). The predecessor to IRC § 269 as
§ 29 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, added to the law by the Revenue Act of
1943, 58 Stat. 47 (1943). The scope of § 129 was narrowed in the Senate so that the
final version of the section required more than a mere "interest" in "property." For a
discussion of the events that led up to the enactment of this provision, see, Harry J.
Rudick, Acquisitions to Avoid Income or Excess Profits Tax: Section 129 of the
Internal Revenue Code, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 196 (1944).
105. S. Rep. No. 78-627, § 59 (1943), as reprinted in 1944 C.B. 973, 1017.
In the earlier House version of the section, tax avoidance needed to be only one of
the principal purposes of the acquisition.
106. Treas. Reg. § 1.269-2(b). The regulations say that the phrase is not
limited to cases involving criminal or civil penalties for fraud. Treas. Reg. § 1.269-1.
"Evasion or avoidance" is broad enough to encompass most acquisitions of a
deduction or other tax benefit which lowers overall tax liability or which exempts an
otherwise taxable entity from taxation. Although the regulations indicate that the
absence of business purpose may be sufficient to trigger the IRC § 269 disallowance
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Determining whether a "principal purpose" is present requires application of
a subjective test that examines all surrounding facts and circumstances to
determine the taxpayer's state of mind. 07 That subjective determination is
aided by examining the objectively observable purpose for the transaction.
As the Fifth Circuit stated, "[t]heoretically the question of purpose is purely
subjective; pragmatically, however, the trier of fact can only determine
purpose from objective facts."' 08
VI. PROPOSAL SUPPORTED BY CURRENT JUDICIAL DOCTRINES
A. Judicial Constraints on Tax Avoidance
In the absence of an express statutory constraint on tax avoidance,
there are well established judicial limitations on tax benefit transfers that
encompass transactions, generally. They are vastly more expansive than the
statutory rules; however, the judicial rules suffer from being less precise, and
because the opinions in which they are contained are subject to the vagaries
of the facts before the court, they appear to lack uniformity in their scope,
applicability, and predictability. Nonetheless, as broad as the judicial
limitations are, they are not so broad as to prevent tax benefits transfers
under the proposed system.
rule, the 5th Circuit held otherwise when saying: "Section 269 is directed to the
principal purpose for the acquisition of control of a corporation, not the absence of a
business purpose in acquiring a corporation's assets." Canaveral Int'l Corp. v.
Comm'r, 61 T.C. 520 (1974). The three-part test set forth in the regulations is also
used in judicial scrutiny of transactions not covered by IRC § 269. See § VI.A of this
paper where this is discussed.
107. Initially, the IRS was not especially successful in IRC § 269 cases
because courts tended to find that most corporate acquisitions and property transfers
at issue served a valid business purpose. See Berland's, Inc. v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 182
(1951) (acq.); Alcorn Wholesale Co. v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 75 (1951) (acq.); WAGE,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 19 T.C. 249 (1952) (acq. and nonacq.); Commodores Point
Terminal Corp. v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 411 (1948) (acq.). Beginning in 1957, however,
courts adopted a narrower view of business purpose. Thus, the 4th Circuit in
Coastal Oil was particularly skeptical of the taxpayer's choice of vehicle for
acquiring a particular loss corporation. Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. CIR, 242 F.2d 396
(4th Cir. 1957) The Tax Court, in Canaveral Int'l Corp denied tax benefits under
section 269 because, while there was a valid business purpose for acquiring stock of
a corporation with a high basis and low value, there was no business purpose for the
particular method of acquisition. Canaveral Int'l Corp. v. Comm'r, 61 T.C. 520
(1974) (acq.) In all, while the courts have not compelled taxpayers to select the least
favorable tax structure, they do require that the taxpayer demonstrate a substantial
business reason for selecting the particular acquisition method.
108. Bobsee Corporation v. U.S., 411 F.2d 231, 238 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Although courts articulate similar tests for determining whether tax
avoidance prevents anticipated tax benefits from being realized, they do not
employ consistent language when describing key components of the tests.
The terms, "intent" and "purpose," are frequently used in different ways, and
the term "motive" is sometimes substituted for "intent" and occasionally for
the term "purpose."'0
In this paper, the taxpayer's "motive" will be used to describe what
caused the taxpayer to enter into the transaction, e.g., was the reason for
entering into the transaction to reduce taxes, to increase profits, etc... .
Motive, as thus defined, is seldom in issue in tax avoidance cases."o The
taxpayer's "intent" for entering into a transaction will be a term used to
describe the taxpayer's subjective expectation for what the transaction will
yield, e.g., did the taxpayer have as its objective for entering into the
transaction to generate tax deductions, to increase cash flow, etc... . This is
usually a controlling factor. The "purpose" for entering into the transaction is
what the taxpayer objectively sought to obtain from the transaction, e.g., a
reduction in tax liability, an increase in pretax profits, etc... .11 In addition to
possessing the requisite intent and purpose, courts examine a transaction to
determine whether the form of the transaction accurately reflects its
substance.
Despite the semantic confusion, the following three tests emerge from
an analysis of the judicial analysis tests. In most instances, courts apply the
tests conjunctively:
109. The 3rd Circuit in ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3rd Cir.
1998), stated that for a transaction to be respected for tax purposes it must have
"objective economic substance" and it must have "subjective business motivation."
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated that "Naturally, the evaluation
of the level of profit motive possessed by a taxpayer in entering into a transaction
involves an inquiry into the subjective motive or intent of the taxpayer. Kirchman v.
Comm'r, 862 F.2d 1486, 1491 (11th Cir. 1989).
110. Apart from considering a taxpayer's intent and purpose for entering
into the transaction, courts also will examine whether the structure of the transaction
accurately reflects its purpose or whether its structure is intended to conceal a tax
avoidance intent. This issue will be discussed below under the heading "Sham
Transactions."
S11l. An illustration of judicial misuse of terminology that results in
confusing the underlying principles is contained in Rice's Toyota World, Inc., v.
Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 92 (4th Cir. 1985) where in affirming the Tax Court the it was
stated: "The business purpose inquiry simply concerns the motives of the taxpayer in
entering the transaction. The record in this case contains ample evidence to support
the tax court's finding that Rice's sole motivation for purchasing and leasing back
the computer under the financial arrangement used was to achieve the large tax
deductions that the transaction provided in the early years of the lease."
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* Is there a business purpose for the transaction?
* If there is no business purpose, does the taxpayer have tax
avoidance intent?
* Does the structure of the transaction reflect its purpose?
Determining whether the taxpayer intended to engage in tax
avoidance is a subjective inquiry. The perceived purpose of the transaction,
whether it is to reduce tax liability, to maximize income, etc..., is determined
from examining objective factors. Form and substance inquiries will turn on
the "economic realities" of the transaction. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to provide a comprehensive discussion of these three tests, but an
overview of them and the relationship to the proposed system is set forth
below.112
B. Is There A Business Purpose for The Transaction?
The requirement that a transaction have a business purpose was
designed to ensure that tax benefits cannot be realized from a transaction if it
is engaged in merely for the purpose of tax reduction.113 As with the tax-
avoidance intent requirement, the business purpose requirement has never
been adopted into statutory law as a condition to transfer of tax benefits in
general.114
A business purpose exists if the taxpayer has a profit motive for
entering into a transaction, and reduction of taxes is not a business
purpose."' 5 In Gregory v. Helvering, the case most often credited with
establishing the business purpose requirement, the putative corporate
reorganization was struck down because it was found to have no purpose
other than to reduce taxes. The Supreme Court noted that a transaction "...
having no business or corporate purpose ... " but designed solely to effectuate
112. For a discussion of the business purpose doctrine, see, generally Boris
I. Bittker and James S. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 7th ed.) 1 12.61[1]. See also,
Acquisitions Made to Avoid Taxes: Section 269, 34 Va. L. Rev. 539 and Wetzler,
"Notes of the Economic Substance and Business Purpose Doctrines" Tax Notes, Jul.
2, 2001 (92 Tax Notes 127).
113. ACM Partnership v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3rd Cir. 1998).
114. It is contained in IRC § 357(b), where it is a test to determine whether
tax avoidance was the purpose of certain transfers of liabilities to a corporation. See
also, Treas. Reg. §§ 1.368-1(c) and 1.355-2(b); Rev. Proc. 96-30, 1996-19 I.R.B. 8
(Appendix A).
115. Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 184 (1983).
3052010]
Florida Tax Review
the taxpayer's tax avoidance intention to reduce taxes would not be respected
for tax purposes. 116
C Does Taxpayer Have Tax Avoidance Intent?
The taxpayer's intent for entering into the transaction is significant
only if there is no business purpose for the transaction. If the taxpayer has a
tax avoidance intent and if the transaction lacks any economic or commercial
purpose, it will not be respected for federal income tax purposes."'
Conversely, if there is a business purpose, tax avoidance intent will not
prevent realization of the tax benefits.
One of the threshold issues decided in Gregory was whether a
transaction that appeared to comply with all statutory requirements for a tax-
free reorganization would, nonetheless, fail to do so if the taxpayer's intent
for entering into the transaction were to avoid taxes. Writing for the Second
Circuit, Judge L. Hand stated uncategorically that "... a transaction,
otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity,
because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one chooses, to evade,
taxation."' 18  The Supreme Court affirmed both the decision and its
reasoning saying: "[t]he legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of
what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means
which the law permits, cannot be doubted."" 9
When faced with the same issue, numerous other courts have
adopted the Gregory holding. For example, the Seventh Circuit in 1997
stated: "[a] tax-avoidance motive is not inherently fatal to a transaction. A
taxpayer has a legal right to conduct his business so as to decrease (or
116. Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809 (2nd Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S.
465 (1935); Casebeer v. Comm'r, 909 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990) stated: "...
the purpose of a transaction should be the guide." Casebeer v. Comm'r, 909 F.2d
1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990) defined a sham transaction as a transaction that "has no
business purpose or economic effect other than the creation of tax deductions."
Lerman v. Comm'r, 939 F.2d 53 (3rd Cir. 1991). Even if a transaction has a business
purpose, the part of the transaction to which it relates may be separated from another
part that has no business purpose if it appears that the taxpayer attempted to cloth the
segment of the transacting lacking a nontax business purpose with the mantle of
respectability.
117. Frank Lyon v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978); Knetsch v.
United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1960). To the contrary, "where a transaction
objectively affects the taxpayer's net economic position, legal relations, or non-tax
business interests, it will not be disregarded merely because it was motivated by tax
considerations." Holladay v. Comm'r, 649 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1981); ACM
P'ship, 157 F.3d at 248 n.31.
118. Gregory, 69 F.2d at 811.
I19 Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469.
306 [Vol.10:2
A Proposal for an Elective Tax Benefits Transfer System
altogether avoid) the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes." 20 The
Fifth Circuit stated: "... it is also well established that where a transaction
objectively affects the taxpayer's net economic position, legal relations, or
non-tax business interests, it will not be disregarded merely because it was
motivated by tax considerations."' 2 1 The Tax Court echoed these sentiments
saying that: "[t]axpayers generally are free to structure their business
transactions as they see fit, even if motivated by tax avoidance, provided a
nontax or business purpose also is present."' 22
D. Does Structure of Transaction Reflect its Purpose?
The structure of the transaction must accurately reveal a business
purpose. Merely structuring a transaction in such a way as to convey the
misleading impression that the transaction has a business purpose, of course,
will fail to satisfy the business purpose requirement. When courts have
determined that a transaction's profit or business form is a mask to its tax
avoidance purpose, the substance of the transaction will be elevated over its
form, and the attempted obfuscation will fail. Thus, a leasing transaction in
which possession is retained by the lessor will be ineffective under this
doctrine in qualifying for the proposed system's tax benefit transfer
provisions.
The substance over form doctrine can be traced to a principle
expressed by Justice Holmes in Corliss v. Bowers, where he wrote that "...
taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with
actual command over the property taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax
is paid." 23 More recently, in Frank Lyon Co. v. U.S., the Court considered
whether the form of a sale/leaseback transaction should be given effect for
tax purposes. It expanded upon its earlier statement and elevated it to the
status of a "doctrine" saying: "[i]n applying this doctrine of substance over
form, the Court has looked to the objective economic realities of a
transaction rather than to the particular form the parties employed." 24
This doctrine is now regularly applied by lower courts to invalidate a
variety of tax avoidance schemes that are found to actually lack business
purpose. Thus, in Del Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, the
District of Columbia Circuit stated that although taxpayers "are entitled to
structure their transactions in such a way as to minimize tax," there must be a
120. N. Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Comm'r, 115 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir.
1997).
121. ACMPartnership, 157 F.3d at 248.
122. Sanderson v. Comm'r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1033 (1985); Gregory, 293
U.S. at 469; Rice's Toyota World, Inc., 81 T.C. at 195-96.
123. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930).
124. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 573.
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purpose for the "business activity ... other than tax avoidance" and that
purpose cannot be a "facade."l2 5 In ACM Partnership v. Commissioner the
Third Circuit similarly concluded that: "We must 'look beyond the form of
[the] transaction' to determine whether it has the 'economic substance that
[its] form represents." [Citations omitted.]1 2 6 The Tax Court in Falsetti v.
Commissioner defined "sham in substance" as the "expedient of drawing up
papers to characterize transactions contrary to objective economic realities
and which have no economic significance beyond expected tax benefits." 2 7
VII. TAXATION OF TRANSFERRED TAX BENEFITS
Assuming that the proposed system is adopted, three fundamental
principles of tax law must be reconciled:
1) Converting a deduction or a credit into a tax savings does
not give rise to any income to the taxpayer.
2) A sale or exchange of property requires gain or loss to be
determined, and, unless an exception applies, any realized
gain or loss thus determined is then recognized,12 8 and
3) When property is purchased, the purchaser's tax basis is the
taxpayer's cost of the property.129
125. Del Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Comm'r, 251 F.3d 210 (D.C. Cir.
2001); ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000). See also
N. Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 115 F.3d at 512 (stating that the IRS cannot "disregard
economic transactions ... which result in actual, non-tax-related changes in economic
position"). In Gregory, the transaction was in full compliance with the letter of the
statute but it violated its spirit. This is not different from setting up a transaction so
that its facts would appear one way but its substance was otherwise. In both of these
transactions, the form is not reflecting its substance. In the reorganization area, the
form may comply with the form required by the statute, but the substance may be
otherwise, as in Gregory.
126. ACM Partnership v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3rd Cir. 1998). The
Supreme Court has refused to permit the transfer of formal legal title to shift the
incidence of taxation attributable to ownership of property where the transferor
continues to retain significant control over the property transferred." Comm'r v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). Comm'r
v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 291 (1946); Helvering v. Lazarus, 308 U.S. 252, 255
(1939). See also Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1958); Comm'r
v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945). Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S.
278, 286 (1960).
127. Falsetti v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 332, 347 (1985).
128. IRC § 1001(c).
129. IRC § 1012(a).
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Tax benefits are property rights. Inherent in business property is the
right granted by Congress to the owner to reduce tax liability by claiming
various deductions and credits associated with the property. 30 If those rights
are transferrable, they become property themselves because property has
been defined as encompassing anything that may be transferred.' 3' The
Supreme Court has said that "[t]he only relevant definitions of 'property' to
be found in the principal standard dictionaries [footnote omitted] are ... that
'property' is the physical thing which is a subject of ownership, or that it is
the aggregate of the owner's rights to control and dispose of that thing." 3 2
Thus, assuming that amendments are made to the Code appropriate to allow
the sale of tax benefits, the right of a property owner to claim CRD or tax
credits would be treated as property disposed of in a transaction in which
gain or loss would have to be determined and the acquiring taxpayer would
have to determine its basis in the acquired property. 33 If these rules are
applied, income or deduction may be created at the time the tax benefit is
sold and the transferee would take a basis that will be equal to only 35% of
the transferor's basis.
Current law provisions that allow tax deductions and credits to be
transferred treat the transfer of tax benefits as tax-free events. For example,
the sale of the "qualified equity investment" that transfers a NMTC results in
no gain or loss with respect to the credit to the transferor. Moreover,
provisions that allow for "nonrecognition" of gain or loss never impose
taxable boot status on any consideration attributable to the value of
transferred tax benefits, such as built-in losses and CRD. In a section 351
transaction the transferor of property who receives stock neither realizes nor
recognized any gain with respect to the value of stock attributable to the
basis of the transferred property.
Consistent with the current treatment of tax benefits, the proposed
system's objective of merely shifting a tax benefit, not creating any income
or deduction or altering the amount of tax basis in the process, would be
achieved by expressly treating the transfer as a nonrecognition exception to
the general recognition rule of section 1001.134 The lessor would neither
realize nor recognize any gain or loss on the sale of benefits. After the sale, it
would have no basis in the leased property that it continues to own. If the
130. This "right" is said to have been granted as "a matter of legislative
grace ... ." Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940).
131. In Hempt Bros., Inc. v. U.S., 354 F.Supp. 1172, 1175 (M.D.Pa.1973),
affd, 490 F.2d 1172 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974).
132. Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947).
133. Black's Law Dictionary defines "property" as, among other things,
"The right to possess, use, and enjoy a determinate thing (either a tract of land or a
chattel); the right of ownership ... ."
134. IRC § 7701(a)(45).
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lessor eventually sells the property after the term of the lease expires for its
residual value, it will determine its gain on the transaction by comparing its
amount realized with a zero tax basis.
Granting the transaction nonrecognition treatment would yield the
intended consequences for the purchaser. Instead of taking a cost basis in the
tax benefit, normal nonrecognition rules call for a transferred tax basis.
Because both the entitlement to, and the amount of, property related tax
credits are determined with reference to tax basis, a transferred basis rule that
places the transferee in the shoes of the transferor will facilitate tax credit
transfers, as well.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A tax-benefit allocation system with appropriate anti-abuse
safeguards will contribute toward a more efficient utilization of tax
incentives. Such a system is to the advantage of both taxpayers and the
government. Tax liability, cash flow, and reported earnings will be more
accurately reflected, competition and decision making will not be distorted,
and taxable transactions intended by the government to be encouraged by
stimulus legislation will occur with greater frequency. The proposed system
furthers these objectives while operating within the confines of well
established anti-avoidance statutory and judicial rules.
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